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Buying Peace? The Political 
Economy of Power-Sharing 
Felix Haaß and Martin Ottmann
Using a power-sharing arrangement to integrate insurgents into a country’s political sys-
tem, either by granting them government cabinet posts or greater territorial autonomy, 
has become an increasingly common method by which to pacify violent conflicts. How-
ever, power-sharing reinforces patterns of corruption and patronage, which are detri-
mental to sustainable peace and development in the long run. This is especially problem-
atic as some of this corrupt behavior is fueled by official development assistance.
Analysis
Power-sharing institutions have been empirically shown to prolong peace after civil 
conflict. Nevertheless, an often overlooked but central mechanism to this is that power-
sharing institutionalises access to state resources for both the government and rebels. 
Political elites from both sides often divert state income to finance their political sup-
port networks or simply to enrich themselves, creating a political economy of corrup-
tion and patronage. 
  Power-sharing often ends long-running bloodshed. But by simply buying off vio-
lent state and non-state actors, it frequently fails to address the root causes of con-
flict. Furthermore, by institutionalising self-enrichment and clientelism, power-
sharing may actually inhibit post-conflict political and economic development in 
the long run.
  Post-conflict countries with power-sharing institutions are, on average, more cor-
rupt than post-conflict countries without power-sharing institutions—at the same 
time, official development assistance to power-sharing countries has increased.
  Post-conflict Liberia and Aceh, Indonesia, show that the political economy of pow-
er-sharing is at play in both political power-sharing arrangements (whereby politi-
cal office is distributed amongst former belligerents) and territorial power-sharing 
arrangements (whereby greater territorial autonomy is granted to a rebel group). 
  International donors need to be aware of the inherent dilemma in buying peace 
through power-sharing: securing peace in the short term can result in increased cor-
ruption. Although corruption may be a necessary side effect of ensuring immediate 
peace, international assistance should focus on reducing corruption in the long run.
Keywords: Power-sharing, corruption, post-conflict peace, Liberia, Indonesia
- 2 -GIGA Focus International Edition/English  9/2015
Introduction
As an instrument to end protracted internal con-
flict over political participation or territorial au-
tonomy, power-sharing has an inherent appeal: 
by meeting the insurgents’ demands, power-shar-
ing can bring an end to violent conflict. In fact, ar-
rangements that mandate joint control of power 
between rebels and governments or that allow for 
greater territorial autonomy have been steadily on 
the rise since the end of the Cold War (see Fig-
ure 1) – for example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(1995), Liberia (2003), the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (2003), Nepal (2006), and Aceh, Indone-
sia (2005) (Ottmann and Vüllers 2015). At the same 
time, international donors have increased official 
development assistance (ODA) to both post-con-
flict countries without power-sharing arrange-
ments and those with power-sharing arrange-
ments (see Figure 2). 
Has this surge in ODA for countries with 
power-sharing agreements paid off? There is 
evidence that power-sharing can indeed decrease 
the risk of conflict relapse (Hartzell and Hoddie 
2007; Walter 2002). In the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), for example, the 2003 Final Act of 
the Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations ended 
a long-running civil war between the government 
in Kinshasa, on the one hand, and the Congolese 
Rally for Democracy (RCD), the Movement for the 
Liberation of Congo (MLC), and a few smaller rebel 
outfits, on the other hand. Crucially, the agreement 
allowed these rebel groups to participate in the 
transitional government that would be in place 
until presidential and parliamentary elections 
were held in 2006. The arrangement enjoyed some 
Figure 1: Trends in Executive Power-Sharing Practices after Conflict
Figure 2: Trends in Aid to Post-Conflict Countries
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success, as the RCD and MLC have not returned to 
large-scale violent conflict.1 Despite this, it is still 
unclear why power-sharing “works” – not only in 
the case of the DRC but also in other instances.
The Political Economy of Power-Sharing and 
Corruption
We argue that power-sharing’s success can be at-
tributed – at least partially – to how such arrange-
ments institutionalise rebels’ and government of-
ficials’ access to state resources and how they cre-
ate a political economy of patronage and corrup-
tion (Haass and Ottmann 2015).
Post-conflict power-sharing takes various 
forms. The most common type is an interim gov-
ernment in which rebels are allocated various cab-
inet posts, which are usually relatively insignifi-
cant – for example, in Djibouti in 2007 rebels were 
given control over the Ministry of Youth, Sports, 
Leisure, and Tourism. However, rebels have on 
occasion managed to secure access to the inner 
core of power and have assumed the presidency 
or vice presidency – such as the MLC’s Jean-Pierre 
Bemba who became vice president of the DRC in 
2003. Another form of power-sharing is the inte-
gration of rebel fighters into a country’s military 
or police force. This type was applied to the reb-
els of the National Union for the Total Indepen-
dence of Angola (UNITA) in Angola; Bosnian, 
Muslim, and Serbian forces in Bosnia and Herze-
govina; and the Moro National Liberation Front in 
the Philippines. A further power-sharing type is 
an economic-based arrangement, which sees reb-
els receive shares in or even control of parastatal 
or state companies. Such economic power-sharing 
was employed in Burundi and Liberia. Granting 
greater territorial autonomy to rebels is also a type 
of power-sharing. In virtually all such cases, reb-
els have assumed positions of power in the new-
ly created subnational governments – such as in 
the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh; Bougain-
ville, Papua New Guinea; and the southern part of 
then Sudan.
Such power-sharing practices are often under-
stood as essential for peacebuilding. The argu-
ment goes that guaranteeing rebels a place in 
their country’s institutional framework will satis-
1 However, other Congolese rebel groups have since emerged, 
meaning that the civil war in the DRC is ongoing.
fy their grievances and remove the causes for vi-
olent unrest. Moreover, power-sharing institu-
tions bring together former foes and allow them 
to overcome their mutual distrust. It is assumed 
that this will fairly quickly break the spiral of an-
imosity and bitter violence (Hartzell and Hoddie 
2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Walter 2002).
However, power-sharing arrangements are not 
panaceas for a post-conflict country’s ills. Even 
though such agreements might be beneficial for 
post-conflict stability in the short term, we would 
expect power-sharing to make post-conflict coun-
tries more prone to corruption, clientelism, and 
patronage than other post-conflict countries for 
two reasons.
First, power-sharing grants rebels access to 
state resources, and the inclusion of former bel-
ligerents adds another player to the game of pa-
tronage and clientelism. Thus, increased competi-
tion by a greater number of actors over a limited 
pool of resources is likely to increase these actors’ 
motivation to enrich themselves and their support 
networks. Rebel organisations are typically based 
on loyalty developed between political leaders 
and military commanders/soldiers during con-
flict (Ottmann 2015). Rebel leaders must cultivate 
these wartime networks to ensure they remain in 
positions of power once the conflict has ended – 
power-sharing gives them access to the resourc-
es to do so. Given the increasing trend of provid-
ing foreign aid to post-conflict countries (Figure 2), 
these resources frequently not only come from do-
mestic sources (such as taxes) but also internation-
al ones (such as foreign aid).
Second, rebel and government actors locked in 
interim power-sharing institutions often have lim-
ited time horizons due to impeding elections; this 
therefore increases the likelihood that these ac-
tors will engage in corrupt and/or clientelistic be-
haviour. The nature of elections means that rebels 
and government elites cannot be certain that they 
will remain in positions that grant them access to 
state resources. Even though government officials 
in developing states without histories of conflict 
encounter similar limited time horizons, power-
sharing countries – which have a history of con-
flict – face an added security dilemma. This exac-
erbates the negative implications of a limited time 
horizon: none of the power-sharing parties can be 
certain that the other side will not return to vio-
lence and unilaterally end the arrangement. As a 
result of this uncertainty, many rebels and gov-
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ernment elites will likely divert as many state re-
sources as they can into their own and their sup-
porters’ pockets (Levi 1989). 
A first look at comparative data on power-
sharing and corruption confirms the implica-
tion of these ideas – namely, that power-shar-
ing countries are more prone to corruption. The 
box plots in Figure 3 compare power-sharing 
and non-power-sharing countries with respect 
to their scores on different measures of corrup-
tion.2 Between 2001 and 2010 power-sharing coun-
tries scored much lower on all major corruption 
indices. Since lower scores indicate higher levels 
of corruption, this means that, on average, pow-
er-sharing countries are more corrupt than non-
power-sharing countries.3 The fact that this trend 
holds across these different indicators is especial-
ly revealing, as no indicator covers all countries at 
all points in time. Taken together, however, these 
data present a relatively comprehensive picture of 
the negative relationship between power-sharing 
and corruption. 
2 A box plot is used to compare distributions of data points. 
Roughly speaking, the further apart the boxes (representing 
50 per cent of all data values) are from each other, the further 
apart are the groups, on average, with respect to the value de-
picted on the y-axis.
3 In our calculation of average corruption estimates, we includ-
ed only those countries that experienced a major civil war 
with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths per year prior to 
the power-sharing arrangement. Data on power-sharing is 
taken from the Power-Sharing Event Dataset (Ottmann and 
Vüllers 2015); corruption data, from the World Bank (<http://
data.worldbank.org>) and Transparency International. Only 
post-conflict periods since 2001 are included because of limit-
ed availability of corruption data before that year.
Buying Peace in Liberia and Aceh
Our explanation that power-sharing often increas-
es the level of corruption in a post-conflict coun-
try is also substantiated by case evidence from Li-
beria and the aftermath of the conflict between the 
province of Aceh in Indonesia and the Indonesian 
government.4 
The first case focuses on post-conflict develop-
ments in Liberia after the 2003 Accra Peace Agree-
ment between the government forces of Charles 
Taylor and the Liberians United for Reconciliation 
and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for 
Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). The Accra Peace 
Agreement proclaimed a commitment to fostering 
mutual trust and promoting better relations be-
tween Liberians. To this end, it formulated a series 
of far-reaching political, economic, and social re-
forms. One of the central pillars of this endeavour 
was the establishment of the National Transition-
al Government of Liberia (NTGL), which presided 
over the country until national elections were held 
in 2006. The NTGL brought together Taylor and 
his supporters from the Liberian government and 
representatives from the two rebel groups, LURD 
and MODEL. Together with representatives from 
political parties and civil society, the Taylor repre-
sentatives, as well as LURD and MODEL leaders 
carefully distributed NTGL cabinet positions in a 
delicate balance amongst each other.
4 The following description of Liberia’s and Aceh’s political 
economy of corruption is based on field research conducted 
by Martin Ottmann in November/December 2013 and March 
2014. Due to the sensitive nature of this topic, most interviews 
were conducted with strict guarantees of confidentiality.
Source: Own calculation based on World Bank and Transparency International data.
Figure 3: Power-Sharing and Corruption
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The second case is the 2005 Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) between the Indonesian 
government and the Free Aceh Movement (Ger-
akan Aceh Merdaka, GAM). In contrast to Libe-
ria, this conflict was localised to mostly the Aceh 
region, with the rebels fighting for an indepen-
dent state of Aceh. Reminiscent of other conflicts 
over autonomy in Asia, the Aceh peace agreement 
proposed a territorial power-sharing arrangement 
which would give the province far-reaching au-
tonomy rights. The core of the MoU between the 
Indonesian government and the GAM was the 
Law on the Governing of Aceh. This was an ac-
ceptable compromise for the GAM as the MoU al-
so allowed the rebel group to compete in provin-
cial elections. In effect, this offered the GAM the 
prospect of being in power in Aceh. Soon after au-
tonomy for Aceh was established, GAM represen-
tatives won positions of power in the province’s 
executive and legislative branches.5 
At first glance, the negotiated settlements in Li-
beria and Aceh appear to function according to the 
central logic of power-sharing – that is, both agree-
ments seem to address the underlying root causes 
of the civil war and attempt to resolve the securi-
ty dilemma between the government and rebels. 
In fact, however it were the economic incentives 
created by the agreements which guaranteed that 
all relevant actors had an incentive to participate 
in the process—the same incentives that created 
a political economy of corruption along the way.
Liberia
Observers of the Liberian peace negotiations have 
concluded that the whole process revolved around 
nothing more than the guarantee of jobs for the 
leading figures of all sides (International Crisis 
Group, 2003). They claim that government and 
rebel participants alike were less concerned with 
making Liberia a more peaceful state than they 
were with debating who should get which min-
isterial positions in the transitional government. 
The Liberian peace agreement also contained de-
tailed appendices that distributed public corpora-
tions and state agencies amongst the warring par-
ties. Representatives of the former Taylor govern-
ment, for example, received control over the Li-
beria Petroleum Refining Corporation, the Liberia 
Water and Sewer Corporation, and the Budget Bu-
5 More detailed information on these (and many other) peace 
agreements can be found in the Power-Sharing Event Dataset 
(PSED) (Ottmann and Vüllers 2015).
reau. Meanwhile, LURD and MODEL were allo-
cated state companies like the Liberia Telecommu-
nications Corporation, the Forest Development 
Authority, and the National Ports Authority. 
These practices allowed corruption to bloom 
within the transitional government: funds were 
embezzled, construction contracts were award-
ed to business partners, and exploitation rights of 
natural resources were given to those willing to 
pay the largest bribe. Human Rights Watch (2005: 
33) reports that on 3 August 2005 “J. D. Slanger, 
the head of Liberia’s Maritime Bureau and a for-
mer senior member of the Movement for Democ-
racy in Liberia (MODEL), was together with two 
of his deputies charged with economic sabotage 
and fraud for their part in siphoning off of USD 
3.5 million of government money.” What is more, 
“NTGL officials also recognised numerous con-
cession agreements, including several for timber 
and diamond mining that violated Security Coun-
cil sanctions. Timber concessions awarded by the 
NTGL and its predecessor covered 2.5 times more 
timbered territory than the country possess” (Re-
no 2013: 128). Outgoing NTGL politicians even 
voted to keep their official Jeep Cherokee vehicles 
(ibid.).
Foreign aid played a major role in the Liberian 
political economy of corruption and patronage by 
significantly contributing to the budgets of almost 
every Liberian ministry and agency (International 
Crisis Group 2004). Data from the AidData project 
and the World Bank show that foreign aid in Li-
beria went from 67 per cent of the country’s gross 
domestic product in 2004 to 199 per cent in 2008 – 
far above the average of about 23 per cent of aid/
GDP in other post-conflict African countries (be-
tween 1990 and 2010). 
When corrupt members of the Liberian elite 
eventually left public office, they were able to use 
their contacts and networks in the government 
and business world to secure positions on pub-
lic corporation boards. The rebels’ rank and file 
fighters did not play a role in Liberia’s new polit-
ical economy. Once they had been disarmed, they 
posed no threat to the new rulers and were con-
sequently ignored. There was little effort on the 
part of the elite in the NTGL and its ministries, 
agencies, commissions, and public corporations 
to reform the conflict-ridden country. Against 
this background, it appears that the Accra Peace 
Agreement was less about addressing the root 
causes of the Liberian civil war and more about 
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putting an end to the fighting by securing posi-
tions in the political economy for Taylor elites, 
LURD leaders, and MODEL leaders.
Aceh, Indonesia
The economic dimensions of conflict resolution 
also featured prominently in Aceh’s MoU. While 
achieving special autonomy for Aceh was indeed 
a crucial achievement for the GAM in particu-
lar and the Acehnese people in general, the GAM 
elite was also intent on rewarding itself and its 
rank and file fighters for their efforts against the 
Indonesian government (Aspinall 2009). In addi-
tion to Aceh’s special status, the government and 
GAM negotiators also agreed on several economic 
opportunities for the province: former combatants 
were to be given financial assistance to build a ci-
vilian existence; Aceh was to keep 70 per cent of 
its oil and gas revenues (a much greater share than 
any of the other Indonesian provinces received); 
and the Aceh government was to have access to a 
special autonomy fund for 20 years from the start 
of the peace agreement. 
For the GAM, occupying political office meant 
control over state funds and, crucially, the exten-
sive reconstruction funds from international and 
national donors following the tragic tsunami in 
December 2004. It is estimated that USD 7.7 billion 
in post-tsunami reconstruction aid was committed 
by the Indonesian government, bilateral and mul-
tilateral donors, and international NGOs (Masyra-
fah and McKeon 2008). 
The GAM and its successor organisations – the 
civilian Aceh Party (Partai Aceh, PA) and the Aceh 
Transitional Committee (Komite Peralihan Aceh, 
KPA), which represents its demobilised fighters –
used their newly won positions of power to sus-
tain and extend their patronage networks and en-
trench their position as a central political power 
broker in Aceh. GAM leaders not only controlled 
which former combatants and war-affected civil-
ians received compensation and financial assis-
tance, they also decided who was hired by gov-
ernment agencies and which businesses were 
awarded provincial government contracts. The 
Aceh construction sector in particular fell prey to 
elites from the PA and the KPA (Aspinall 2009). 
As a result of favouritism and distributive politics, 
political and economic power in Aceh is now firm-
ly in the hands of these actors. As in Liberia, this 
political economy of patronage and corruption is 
merely a continuation of the previous system. The 
peace in Aceh is therefore at least partially due to 
the fact that the GAM and its successor organisa-
tions, the PA and the KPA, have managed to inte-
grate themselves into the broader Indonesian po-
litical economy.
What can be done?
Power-sharing can be a successful instrument to 
curb the violence of civil conflict. Yet, by essentially 
buying off armed opponents it can also foster pa-
tronage and corruption, thus endangering long-
term peacebuilding and development. Power-
sharing often brings rebel groups into an existing 
system of corruption. Together with the pressure 
of early post-conflict elections and often a limited 
period in office, the incentives are high for rebels 
and government officials to engage in corrupt be-
haviour. In countries that receive large amounts of 
development aid the opportunities to divert state 
funds into private bank accounts or the pockets of 
key supporters are bigger. Although such funds 
might pacify a country in the short term – espe-
cially if a power-sharing arrangement is in place 
to ensure that each faction receives their proper 
share of aid spoils – they might paradoxically con-
tribute to entrenching a system of patronage and 
corruption.
We do not, however, advocate an end to all de-
velopment aid to power-sharing countries or the 
non-use of power-sharing as an instrument of con-
flict resolution. Both aid and power-sharing play 
crucial roles in stabilising post-conflict situations, 
and ending bloodshed must be the main goal of all 
parties involved. 
Nonetheless, we want to highlight the inherent 
dilemma between power-sharing, corruption, and 
international aid. Corruption might be the cost of 
peace, at least in the short term, but it can under-
mine the legitimacy and stability of post-conflict 
political systems in the long term. However, do-
nors must be aware that anti-corruption measures 
that are too rigid may threaten a fragile stability 
that is held together by the distribution of spoils. 
Therefore, donors should slowly push for institu-
tional mechanisms that control access to state re-
source and regulate how funds are used once the 
immediate post-conflict phase has passed and ba-
sic stability has been ensured. Fostering adminis-
trative institutional capacity, such as profession-
alised and independent finance ministries that can 
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control resource flows, are crucial instruments in 
that regard. Such institutions are, however, often 
secondary to more pressing issues such as disar-
mament or political compensation. Nevertheless, 
they are indispensable tools to prevent short-term 
corruption from becoming completely entrenched 
in the future of a post-conflict state.
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